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CASE COMMENT: Pouncey v. 
State-Guilty and Insane 
I n Pouncey v. State, 297 Md. 264, 465 A.2d 475 (1983), the Court of Appeals held that a defendant in 
a criminal case could be found both 
guilty of a crime and insane at the time of 
its commission. In so holding, the Court 
determined that an insanity verdiet does 
not necessarily defeat the element of 
criminal intent. 
To reach a verdiet of guilty, the de-
mands of due process require that the 
prosecution prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant engaged in a 
prohibited act (actus reus) and that the 
defendant possessed the criminal intent 
(mens rea) to commit such an act. In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 (1970); see 
generally, R. Perkins and R. Boyce, 
Criminal Law 78-81 (3rd ed. 1982). T ra-
ditionally, a finding of insanity during 
the commission of a crime would prevent 
the rendering of a guilty verdiet because 
it was deemed that the defendant, in being 
insane, was incapable of forming the re-
quired criminal intent. See Bethea v. 
United States, 365 A.2d 64, 72 n.15 
(D.C. App. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 
911 (1976). 
In Pouncey, the defendant was charged 
with the first degree murder of her five 
year old son. She pleaded not guilty and 
interposed the defense of insanity. The 
evidence disclosed that the defendant 
believed her son was pursued by the devil 
and the only way to prevent her son from 
going to hell was to kill him. The evi-
dence further disclosed that the defen-
dant had drowned her son and that she 
was legally insane at the time the crime 
was committed. The trial court found 
the defendant guilty of first degree mur-
der and legally insane at the time of the 
offense. The defendant appealed to the 
Court of Special Appeals, claiming that 
the verdiets of guilty and insane were 
mutually inconsistent and that she was 
entitled to a verdiet of not guilty. The 
Court of Appeals granted certiorari prior 
to a decision by the Court of Special 
Appeals. 
In Pouncey, the Court of Appeals stated 
that the insanity defense in Maryland was 
defined by statute and court rule. Pouncey 
v. State, 297 Md. at 266,465 A.2d at 476. 
The Court noted that the Health-General 
Code identifies the test for insanity and 
responsibility for criminal conduct and 
provides: 
A defendant is not responsible for 
criminal conduct if, at the time of 
that conduct, the defendant, be-
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cause of mental retardation or a 
mental disorder, lacks substantial 
capacity: 
( 1) 1'0 appreciate the criminality 
of that conduct; or 
(2) To conform that conduct to 
the requirements of law." 
MD. HEALTH GEN. CODE ANN. §12-
107 (1982).1 
Having disclosed the statutory law, 
the Court noted that the verdict of guilty 
and insane was not without precedent in 
Maryland. Four years earlier, under a 
statute not different in substance from 
the criminal responsibility test set out 
above, the court in Langworthy v. State, 
284 Md. 588,399 A.2d 578 (1979), cert. 
denied, 450 U.S. 960 (1979), "held that 
a person found guilty of a crime charged, 
yet successful in asserting an insanity de-
fense, could appeal from the guilty ver-
diet." Id., as cited in Pouncey v. State, 297 
Md. at 266-267, 465 A.2d at 477. The 
court in Pouncey then concluded that, 
"necessary to that determination was a 
finding that a guilty verdiet is not incon-
sistent with a special verdiet of insanity." 
Id., 297 Md. at 267,465 A.2d at 477. 
Although the court in Langworthy was 
concerned with determining whether the 
verdiet of guilty and insane was a final 
judgment and thus appealable, it did not 
miss the opportunity to interpret the in-
sanity statute then in effect. Without 
pointing to any explicit legislative history 
directed to the statute, the court in lang-
worthy reasoned that since the Court of 
Special Appeals had previously deter-
mined that the demands of due process 
require a defendant be provided the op-
portunity to prove his innocence even 
though the prosecution has accepted the 
defendant's insanity plea, then the statu-
tory scheme for insanity must contem-
plate that there first be a determination 
of guilt or innocence followed by a deter-
mination of insanity. Langworthy v. State, 
284 Md. at 598, 399 A.2d at 584; see also 
case comment, A Defendant Found Guilty 
But Insane May Appeal His Conviction: 
continued on page 26 
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III. 
Concluding that Title VII would have 
been violated had the defendants run the 
entire deferred compensation plan 
themselves, without participation by 
insurance companies, the Court then 
focused attention on the issue of 
whether a Title VII violation has been 
committed, given the fact it was the 
insurance companies chosen by Arizona 
to participate in the plan that calculated 
and paid the retirement benefits. 
The Court, for purposes of resolving 
the issue, found it necessary to define 
the limits of Title VII violations. In so 
doing, the Court again finding strength 
from its opinion in Manhart, found that 
Title VII "primarily govern(s) relations 
between employees and their employer, 
not between employees and third 
parties." Norris, 103 S.Ct. at 3499, 
quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 718, n. 
33. However, the Court in Manhart was 
quick to point out that despite said 
"relations" such a limitation would not 
disallow an employer to set aside equal 
retirement contributions for each em-
ployee and let each, upon retirement, 
purchase benefits in the open market. 
Manhart, 435 U.S. at 717-18 (footnote 
omitted). 
The defendants seized this language 
and argued they did not violate Title VII 
because the annuity plans offered by the 
companies participating in the Arizona 
plan reflect those available in the open 
market. Unfortunately, no relevance or 
substance was found in this defense by 
the Court; rather, it found that Arizona 
did not simply set aside retirement 
benefits and allow employees to purchase 
annuities in the open market, but created 
a plan whereby employees could ob-
tain an annuity only if they invested 
in a company specifically chosen by 
Arizona. In essence, by requiring 
employees to choose from companies 
selected only by the state, Arizona 
became a party to each annuity contract 
entered into by one of its employees. 
The Court then reiterated the well 
established rule, that "both parties to a 
discriminatory contract are liable for 
any discriminatory provisions the con-
tract contains, regardless of whieh party 
initially suggested inclusion of the 
discriminatory provisions." Norris, 103 
S.Ct. at 3501-02, See Williams v. New 
Orleans Steamship Ass'n., 673 F.2d 742, 
750-51 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 
_U.S._ (1983). 
continued on page 24 
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Langworthy v. State, 39 Md. L. Rev. 538, 
540 (1980). Thus, one could first be 
found guilty by the evidence presented 
and then be found insane under the sta~ 
tutory scheme. 
The rationale of the Langworthy court 
is not convincing. The demands of due 
process require that the prosecution 
prove the element of mens rea before one 
can be found guilty. See Mullaney v. Wil-
bur, 421 U.S. 684(1975); Statev. Grady, 
276 Md. 178,34 A.2d 436 (1975). In 
the Court's opinion, there is little attempt 
to reconcile the verdict of guilty and in-
sanity with the prosecution's responsi-
bility to prove guilt. Only at the very end 
of the Langworthy opinion, within a 
footnote, is such an attempt made. 
We do not subscribe to the theory 
of the Court of Special Appeals 
that a finding that a defendant was 
insane at the time of the commis~ 
sion of the crime means that [t ]here 
is no crime. Langworthy v. State, 39 
Md. App. 559,561,387 A.2d634 
(1978). Its reasoning was that the 
finding of insanity establishes a 
lack of mens rea. Id. We do not think 
that this is so in light of the condi-
tions prescribed for a finding of 
insanity, namely "as a result of a 
mental disorder, a defendant lacks 
substantial capacity to either ap-
preciate the criminality of his con~ 
duct or to conform his conduct to 
the requirements of law." Code 
(1957, 1972 Repl. Vol.) art 59, 
25). Neither of these tests is [sic] 
necessary at variance with a general 
intent to commit a crime .... 
Id., 284 Md. at 599 n.12, 399 A.2d at 584. 
[emphasis added] 
In Pouncey, the Court embraced the 
dicta and logic of Langworthy. Again in a 
footnote the court provided that: 
Since Langworthy, the [statute 
directed to the insanity defense] 
has been recodified without change. 
We see no reason to interpret the 
recodified statute any differently, 
especially in light of the maxim that 
readoption of statutory language 
by the legislature without change is 
presumed to have incorporated 
prior judicial interpretations of 
that language .... 
Pouncey v. State, 297 Md. at 268 n.2, 465 
A.2d at 478. 
The court also stated, as in Langworthy, 
that the reference to "not guilty by rea; 
son of insanity" is a holdover from com-
mon law concepts, id., and also provided: 
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that a finding of insanity is not tan-
tamount to an absence of mens rea 
or inconsistent with a general in~ 
tent to commit a crime. In drown-
ing her child, the appellant specifi~ 
cally intended to kill him, and while 
her successful insanity defense 
means that she is not criminally 
responsible for her conduct, that 
determination merely relieves her 
of liability for punishment under 
the criminal law. 
Id., 297 Md. at 269, 465 A.2d at 478. 
Three conclusions can be drawn from 
the court's opinion. The first is that the 
insanity statute does not necessarily ad~ 
dress criminal intent. Secondly, the ver~ 
dict of "not guilty by reason of insanity" 
is a mere holdover of common law con-
cepts and probably no longer recognized 
within Maryland.2 Finally, one who is 
found guilty and insane is relieved of1ia~ 
bility for punishment under the criminal 
law. 
Although the court seems content 
with the rationale in support of the first 
conclusion, the issue whether the statute 
addresses general criminal intent is 
complex. For instance, it is difficult to 
see how the first prong of the test-that 
a defendant is not responsible for crimi~ 
nal conduct if he lacks substantial capa~ 
city to appreciate the criminality of his 
conduct-is not necessarily directed to 
criminal intent. See Johnson v. State, 292 
Md. 405, 425 n. 10,439 A.2d 542,554 
(1982). Indeed the Court of Special Ap~ 
peals has twice ruled that it is. Lang-
worthy v. State, 39 Md. App. 559, 561, 
387 A.2d 634 (1978), rev'd., 284 Md. 
588, 399 A.2d 578 (1979); Gardner v. 
State, 41 Md. App. 186, 195,396 A.2d 
303, aff'd, 286 Md. 520,408A.2d 1317 
(1979). In Pouncey, the defendant was 
charged with murder in the first degree, 
a specific intent crime. In such a crime, 
the prosecution in Maryland must prove 
that the intentional killing of another 
was willful, deliberate and premeditated, 
and also without justification, excuse or 
mitigation. See Md. Opinion No. 82~ 
844 (to be published at 67 Op. Att'y 
Gen. 292)(filed Dec. 23, 1982). It is 
hard to imagine how a finding of specific 
intent could be maintained even under 
the second prong-that a defendant is 
not responsible if he lacks substantial 
capacity to conform conduct to the re~ 
quirements of law-when one is found 
insane. If one lacks substantial capacity 
to conform to the conduct proscribed 
by law and is therefore insane, then one 
surely is not without excuse for acts 
committed and should be absolved of 
murder in the first degree. Again, the 
court failed to address this issue. 
The second conclusion of the court, 
that the insanity defense is merely a 
holdover from the common law and 
should be ignored, can be accepted if one 
agrees with the court's first conclusion. 
However, in light of the above discussion, 
the court's first conclusion, and thus the 
second, appears suspect. 
The third conclusion, that a verdict of 
guilty and insane means that one is not 
criminally responsible and therefore not 
subject to punishment is without merit. 
As the defendant in Pouncey points out, a 
guilty verdict burdens the defendant 
with a record of criminal conviction. The 
defendant in such a circumstance is pro-
hibited from voting, from serving on a 
jury, from acquiring various government 
licenses or contracts and also will be in-
hibited from acquiring future employ-
ment opportunities. Id., 297 Md. at 269, 
465 A.2d at 478. Although one does not 
spend time in the jail house under such a 
verdict, these are real sanctions and are 
designed to be punitive. 
The verdict of guilty and insane in 
Maryland is not unique with Pouncey. 
However, the verdict raises questions of 
due process which the court has yet to 
address. Although the verdict is not a 
new one, it can hardly be considered 
established until such questions are con~ 
side red and answered. In the interim, a 
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity 
would appear to be a proper verdict, 
where the state could prove the actus reus 
but has failed to prove the defendant 
sane when the defendant successfully in-
terposes the plea of insanity. m 
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Notes 
I Title 12 of the Health-General Article has 
been amended in 1984. The test for insanity 
remains the same, but the "insanity" ver-
dict is now called the "criminal responsi-
bility" verdict. The test is now codified at 
MD. HEALTH GEN. CODE ANN. §12-108(a) 
(1984). 
2 This conclusion mis further supported by 
the legislature's change of language from 
"insanity" to "Criminal responsibility" 
in the new statute. MD. HEALTH GEN. 
CODE ANN. TITLE 12 (1984). 
